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1 Introduction
We present an analysis of the semantic interpretation of intensional verbs such
as seek that allows them to take direct objects of either individual or quanti-
fier type, producing both de dicto and de re readings in the quantifier case, all
without needing to stipulate type-raising or quantifying-in rules. This simple
account follows directly from our use of logical deduction in linear logic to ex-
press the relationship between syntactic structures and meanings. While our
analysis resembles current categorial approaches in important ways ((Moortgat
, 1988; Moortgat , 1992a; Morrill , 1993; Carpenter , 1993)), it differs from them
in allowing the greater type flexibility of categorial semantics ((van Benthem ,
1991)) while maintaining a precise connection to syntax. As a result, we are
able to provide derivations for certain readings of sentences with intensional
verbs and complex direct objects that are not derivable in current purely cate-
gorial accounts of the syntax-semantics interface. The analysis forms a part of
our ongoing work on semantic interpretation within the framework of Lexical-
Functional Grammar.
2 Theoretical Background
As a preliminary to presenting our analysis of intensional verbs, we outline our
approach to semantic interpretation in LFG.
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Figure 1: Semantic Interpretation Architecture
It is well known that surface constituent structure does not always provide
the optimal set of constituents or hierarchical structure to guide semantic in-
terpretation. This has led to efforts to develop more abstract structures for the
representation of relevant syntactic information. We follow Kaplan and Bresnan
(1982) and Halvorsen (1983) in taking the functional structure or f-structure of
LFG as the primary input to semantic interpretation. The syntactic structures
of LFG, the constituent structure or c-structure and the f-structure, are related
by means of a functional correspondence, represented in Figure 1 by solid lines
leading from nodes of the c-structure tree to f-structures ((Kaplan and Bresnan ,
1982)).1 In more recent work, Kaplan (1987) and Halvorsen and Kaplan (1988)
have proposed to extend the theory of correspondences to other structures,
called projections . Here, we will appeal to a semantic projection σ, relating
f-structures and their meanings. Notationally, a subscript σ will indicate the
semantic or σ projection of an f-structure f , so that the semantic projection of
f will be written fσ. In Figure 1, dotted lines represent the relation between
f-structures and their semantic projections. Finally, as shown in the figure, the
semantic projection fσ of an f-structure f can be put in correspondence with a
meaning φ:
(1) fσ❀φ
Informally, we read this expression as “the meaning of f is φ”. We use ex-
pressions of this sort to lexically associate meanings with f-structures, as in the
following lexical entry for the word Bill :
(2) Bill (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
↑σ ❀Bill
1The c-structure and f-structure presented here have been simplified to show only the
detail necessary for the semantic issues addressed here. We also do not address a number
of orthogonal semantic issues (tense and aspect, for example), providing only enough details
of the representation of the meaning of a sentence to illustrate the points relevant to the
discussion at hand.
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The first line of this lexical entry:
(↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
says (roughly) that the word Bill introduces an f-structure ↑ whose pred is
‘Bill’. The second line:
↑σ ❀Bill
says that the meaning of that f-structure is Bill. When a lexical entry is used,
the metavariable ‘↑’ is instantiated with some constant f denoting an f-structure
((Kaplan and Bresnan , 1982, page 183)). In particular, the term ↑σ is instanti-
ated to the semantic projection fσ of f and the formula ↑σ ❀Bill is instantiated
to fσ❀Bill, asserting that the meaning of f is Bill.
More complicated lexical entries give not only meanings for f-structures,
but also instructions for assembling f-structure meanings from the meanings of
other f-structures. We distinguish ameaning language, in which we represent the
meanings of f-structures, and a composition language or glue language, in which
we describe how to assemble the meanings of f-structures from the meanings
of their substructures. Each lexical entry will contain a composition language
formula, its meaning constructor, specifying how a lexical entry contributes to
the meaning of any structure in which it participates.
In principle, the meaning language can be any suitable logic. Here, since we
are concerned with the semantics of intensional verbs, we will use Montague’s
higher-order intensional logic IL. The expressions that appear on the right side
of the ❀ connective in lexical entries like (2) above are (usually open) terms in
the meaning language.
Our composition language is a fragment of linear logic with higher-order
quantification. While the resource sensitivity of linear logic is crucial to our
overall interpretation framework, it does not play a central role in the analysis
discussed here, so the linear connectives can be informally read as their classical
counterparts.2 In contrast to standard approaches, which use the λ-calculus to
combine fragments of meaning via ordered applications, we combine fragments
of meaning through unordered conjunction and implication. Rather than using
λ-reduction to simplify meanings, we rely on deduction, as advocated by Pereira
((1990; 1991)).
2We make use of linear logic ((Girard , 1987)) because its resource sensitivity turns out
to be a good match to natural language. This property of linear logic nicely captures, among
other things, the LFG requirements of coherence and consistency , and enables a nice treat-
ment of modification ((Dalrymple et al. , 1993)), quantification ((Dalrymple et al. , 1994)),
and complex predicates ((Dalrymple et al. , 1993)). We make use only of the tensor fragment
of linear logic. The fragment is closed under conjunction, universal quantification and implica-
tion. It arises from transferring to linear logic the ideas underlying the concurrent constraint
programming scheme of Saraswat ((1989)). A nice tutorial introduction to linear logic itself
may be found in Scedrov ((1993)).
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3 A Simple Example
We now turn to a simple example to illustrate the framework. The lexical entries
necessary for the example in Figure 1 are:3
(3) Bill (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
↑σ = Bill
left (↑ pred)= ‘leave’
∀X. (↑ subj)σ❀X −◦ ↑σ ❀ leave(X)
The symbol ‘ −◦ ’ is the linear implication operator of linear logic; for this
paper, ‘ −◦ ’ can be thought of as analogous to classical implication ‘→’. The
formula
∀X. (↑ subj)σ❀X −◦ ↑σ ❀ leave(X)
states that the verb left requires a meaningX for its subject, (↑ subj); when that
meaning is provided, the meaning for the sentence will be leave(X). When the
words Bill and left are used in a sentence, the metavariable ↑ will be instantiated
to a particular f-structure, and the meaning given in the lexical entry will be
used as the meaning of that f-structure.
Here we repeat the f-structure in Figure 1, including labels for ease of refer-
ence:
(4)
f :
[
pred ‘leave’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
] ]
Annotated phrase structure rules provide instructions for assembling this f-
structure by instantiating the metavariables ‘↑’ in the lexical entries above. For
instance, the metavariable ‘↑’ in the lexical entry for Bill is instantiated to the
f-structure labeled g.
From the instantiated lexical entries of Bill and left , we have the following
semantic information:
(5) leave: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀ leave(X)
Bill: gσ❀Bill
where leave andBill are names for their respective formulas. By modus ponens,
we deduce:
Bill, leave ⊢ fσ❀ leave(Bill)
The elements of the f-structure provide a set of formulas in the composition
logic that introduce semantic elements and describe how they can be combined.
3 In the composition language, we use upper-case letters for essentially existential variables,
that is, Prolog-like variables that become instantiated to particular terms during a derivation,
and lower-case letters for essentially universal variables that stand for new local constants
(also called eigenvariables) during a derivation.
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For example, lexical items for words that expect arguments, like verbs, typi-
cally contribute a formula for combining the meanings of their arguments into
a result. Once all the formulas are assembled, deduction in the logic is used
to infer the meaning of the entire structure. Throughout this process we main-
tain a clear distinction between meanings proper and assertions about meaning
combinations.
4 Quantification
We now turn to an overview of our analysis of quantification (Dalrymple, Lamp-
ing, Pereira, and Saraswat 1993). As a simple example, consider the sentence
(6) Every man left.
For conciseness, we will not illustrate the combination of the meaning con-
structors for every and man; instead, we will work with the derived meaning
constructor for the subject every man, showing how it combines with the mean-
ing constructor for left to produce a meaning constructor giving the meaning of
the whole sentence.
The basic idea of our analysis of quantified NPs can be seen as a logical
counterpart at the semantic composition level of the generalized-quantifier type
assignment for (quantified) NPs ((Barwise and Cooper , 1981)). Under that
assignment, a NP meaning Q has type
(e→ t)→ t
—that is, a function from a property, the scope of quantification, to a proposi-
tion. At the semantic composition level, we can understand that type as follows.
If by assuming that x is the entity referred to by the NP we can derive Sx as the
meaning of the scope of quantification, where S is a property (a function from
entities to propositions), then we can derive QS as the meaning of the whole
clause containing the NP.
The f-structure for the sentence Every man left is:
(7)
f :


pred ‘leave’
subj g:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘man’
] 
The meaning constructors for every man and left are:4
4We use throughout the convenient abbreviation Q(x,Rx, Sx) for the application of the
generalized quantifier Q to restriction R and scope S.
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(8) leave: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀ leave(X)
every-man: ∀H,S. (∀x.gσ❀x −◦ H❀Sx)
−◦ H❀every(z,man(z), Sz)
The meaning constructor for left is as before. The meaning constructor for
every man quantifies over semantic projections H which constitute possible
quantification scopes; its propositional structure corresponds to the standard
type assignment, (e→ t)→ t. It can be paraphrased as:
∀H,S.
(∀x. gσ❀x
{
if, by assuming an arbitrary
meaning x for g,
−◦ H❀Sx)
{
a meaning Sx for some scope
H can be derived,
−◦ H❀every(z,man(z), Sz)
{
then a possible complete
meaning forH can be derived.
In the case at hand, the semantic projection fσ will be chosen to provide the
scope of quantification.5 It has exactly the form that the antecedent of every-
man expects. The meaning S will be instantiated to λx.leave(x). From the
premises in (8), we can deduce the meaning of the scope f-structure f :
every-man, leave ⊢ fσ❀every(z,man(z), leave(z))
The resource sensitivity of linear logic ensures that the scope of quantification
is constructed and used exactly once.
5 Intensional Verbs
We follow Montague ((1974)) in requiring intensional verbs like seek to take an
object of NP type. What is interesting is that this is the only step required
in our setting to obtain the appropriate ambiguity predictions for intensional
verbs. The de re/de dicto ambiguity of a sentence like Bill seeks a unicorn:
de dicto reading: seek(Bill,ˆλQ.a(x, unicorn(x), [ˇ Q](x)))
de re reading: a(x, unicorn(x), seek(Bill,ˆλQ.[ˇ Q](x)))
is a natural consequence, in our setting, of seek taking an NP-type argument.
We assign the following lexical entry to the verb seek :
5From what has been said so far, gσ could also be chosen to provide the scope, leading
to a nonsensical result. As explained in our full analysis of quantifiers (Dalrymple, Lamp-
ing, Pereira, and Saraswat 1993), that problem is avoided by using a family of ❀ relations
indexed by the type of their second argument. The relation for the meaning of the scope of
quantification is the one that expects a proposition meaning, so gσ can not provide a scope.
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(9) seek (↑ pred) = ‘seek’
∀Z, Y. (↑ subj)σ❀Z
⊗(∀s, p.(∀X.(↑ obj)σ❀X −◦ s❀p(X)) −◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))
−◦ ↑σ ❀seek(Z,ˆY )
The significant fact here is that seek differs from an extensional verb such as find
below (corresponding to the type e→ e→ t) in its specification of requirements
on its object:
(10) find (↑ pred) = ‘find’
∀Z, Y.(↑ subj)σ❀Z ⊗ (↑ obj)σ❀Y −◦ ↑σ ❀find(Z, Y )
Note also the use of the operators “ˆ ” and “ˇ ” of IL. Computationally, this
implies that our proofs have to be carried out in a logic whose terms are (typed)
lambda-expressions that satisfy α−, β− and η-equality and also the law (ˇˆ P ) =
P , for all P .
The lexical entry for seek can be paraphrased as follows:
∀Z, Y. (↑ subj)σ❀Z⊗
{
The verb seek requires a
meaning Z for its subject and
(∀s, p.
(∀X. (↑ obj)σ❀X
−◦ s❀p(X))
−◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))


a meaning ˆY for its object,
where Y is an NP meaning ap-
plied to the meaning p of an
arbitrarily-chosen ‘scope’ s,
(∗)
−◦ ↑σ ❀seek(Z,ˆY )
{
to produce the clause mean-
ing seek(Z,ˆY ).
Rather than looking for an entity type meaning for its object, the requirement
expressed by the subformula labeled (∗) exactly describes the form of quantified
NP meanings discussed in the previous section. In this case, a quantified NP
in the object position is one that can accept anything that takes a meaning for
(↑ obj)σ to a meaning for any s, and convert that into a meaning for the s.
In particular, the quantified NP a unicorn will fill the requirement, as we now
demonstrate.
The f-structure for Bill seeks a unicorn is:
(11)
f :


pred ‘seek’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
spec ‘a’
pred ‘unicorn’
]


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The semantic information associated with this f-structure is:
seeks: ∀Z, Y. gσ❀Z
⊗(∀s, p.(∀X.hσ❀X −◦ s❀p(X)) −◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(z, Yˆ )
Bill: gσ❀Bill
a-unicorn: ∀H,S.(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ H❀Sx) −◦ H❀a(z, unicorn(z), Sz)
These are the premises for the deduction of the meaning of the sentence Bill
seeks a unicorn. From the premises Bill and seeks, we can conclude by modus
ponens:
Bill-seeks: ∀Y.(∀s, p.(∀X.hσ❀X −◦ s❀p(X)) −◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆY )
Different derivations starting from the premises Bill-seeks and a-unicorn will
yield the different readings of Bill seeks a unicorn that we seek.
5.1 De Dicto Reading
The formula a-unicorn is exactly what is required by the antecedent of Bill-
seeks provided that the following substitutions are performed:
H 7→ s
S 7→ p
X 7→ x
Y 7→ λP.a(z, unicorn(z), [ˇ P ](z))
We can thus conclude the desired de dicto reading:
fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆλP.a(z, unicorn(z), [ˇ P ](z)))
To show how the premises also support a de re reading, we take first a short
detour through a simpler example.
5.2 Nonquantified Objects
The meaning constructor for seek also allows for nonquantified objects as argu-
ments, without needing a special type-raising rule. Consider the f-structure for
the sentence Bill seeks Al:
(12)
f :


pred ‘seek’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
pred ‘Al’
]


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hσ❀Al ⊢ hσ❀Al s❀P (Al ) ⊢ s❀P (Al )
hσ❀Al , hσ❀Al −◦ s❀P (Al ) ⊢ s❀P (Al )
hσ❀Al , (∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀P (x)) ⊢ s❀P (Al )
hσ❀Al ⊢ (∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀P (x)) −◦ s❀P (Al )
hσ❀Al ⊢ ∀P.(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀P (x)) −◦ s❀P (Al )
Figure 2: Proof that Al can function as a quantifier
The lexical entry for Al is analogous to the one for Bill . We begin with the
premises Bill-seeks and Al:
Bill-seeks: ∀Y.(∀s, p.(∀X.hσ❀X −◦ s❀p(X)) −◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆY )
Al: hσ❀Al
For the derivation to proceed, Al must supply the NP meaning constructor
that Bill-seeks requires. This is possible because Al can map a proof Π of the
meaning for s from the meaning for h into a meaning for s, simply by supplying
hσ❀Al to Π. Formally, from Al we can prove (Figure 2):
(13) ∀P.(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀P (x)) −◦ s❀P (Al )
This corresponds to the Montagovian type-raising of a proper name meaning to
an NP meaning, and also to the undirected Lambek calculus derivation of the
sequent e⇒ (e→ t)→ t.
Formula (13) with the substitutions
P 7→ p, Y 7→ λP.[ˇ P ](Al )
can then be used to satisfy the antecedent of Bill-seeks to yield the desired
result:
fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆλP.[ˇ P ](Al ))
It is worth contrasting the foregoing derivation with treatments of the same
issue in the lambda calculus. The function λx.λP.Px raises a term like Al to
the quantified NP form λP.P (Al ), so it is easy to modify Al to make it suitable
for seek. But the conversion must be explicitly applied somewhere, either in
a meaning postulate or in an alternate definition for seek, in order to carry
out the derivation. This is because a lambda calculus function must specify
exactly what is to be done with its arguments and how they will interact. It
must presume some functional form of its arguments in order to achieve its
own function. Thus, it is impossible to write a function that is indifferent with
respect to whether its argument is Al or λP.P (Al ).
In the deductive framework, on the other hand, the exact way in which
different propositions can interact is not fixed, although it is constrained by
9
I❀Z ⊢ I❀Z S❀P (Z) ⊢ S❀P (Z)
I❀Z, I❀Z −◦ S❀P (Z) ⊢ S❀P (Z)
I❀Z, (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) ⊢ S❀P (Z)
I❀Z ⊢ (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) −◦ S❀P (Z)
I❀Z ⊢ ∀S, P. (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) −◦ S❀P (Z)
⊢ I❀Z −◦ ∀S, P. (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) −◦ S❀P (Z)
⊢ ∀I, Z. I❀Z −◦ ∀S, P. (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) −◦ S❀P (Z)
Figure 3: General Type-Raising Theorem
their (logical and quantificational) propositional structure. Thus hσ❀Al can
function as any logical consequence of itself, in particular as:
∀S, P. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) −◦ S❀P (Al )
This flexibility, which is also found in syntactic-semantic analyses based on
the Lambek calculus and its variants ((Moortgat , 1988; Moortgat , 1992b; van
Benthem , 1991)), seems to align well with some of the type flexibility in natural
language.
5.3 Type Raising and Quantifying In
The derivation in Figure 2 can be generalized as shown in Figure 3 to produce
the general type-raising theorem:
(14) ∀I, Z. I❀Z −◦ (∀S, P. (∀x.I❀x −◦ S❀P (x)) −◦ S❀P (Z))
This theorem can be used to raise meanings of e type to (e → t) → t type, or,
dually, to quantify into verb argument positions. For example, with the variable
instantiations
I 7→ hσ
X 7→ x
P 7→ p
S 7→ s
Y 7→ λR.[ˇ R](Z)
we can use transitivity of implication to combine (14) with Bill-seeks to derive:
Bill-seeks′: ∀Z. hσ❀Z −◦ fσ❀seek(Bill, λˆR.[ˇ R](Z))
This formula can then be combined with arguments of type e to produce a
meaning for fσ. For instance, it will take the non-type-raised hσ❀Al to yield
the same result
fσ❀seek(Bill, λˆR.[ˇ R](Al ))
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as the combination of Bill-seeks with the type-raised version of Al. In fact,
Bill-seeks′ corresponds to type e → t, and can thus be used as the scope
of a quantifier, which would then quantify into the intensional direct object
argument of seek. As we will presently see, that is exactly what is needed to
derive de re readings.
5.4 De Re Reading
We have just seen how theorem (14) provides a general mechanism for quantify-
ing into intensional argument positions. In particular, it allowed the derivation
of Bill-seeks′ from Bill-seeks. Now, given the premises
Bill-seeks′: ∀Z. hσ❀Z −◦ fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆλR.[ˇ R](Z))
a-unicorn: ∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀Sx) −◦ H❀a(z, unicorn(z), Sz)
and the variable substitutions
Z 7→ x
H 7→ fσ
S 7→ λz.seek(Bill, λˆR.[ˇ R](z))
we can apply modus ponens to derive the de re reading of Bill seeks a unicorn:
fσ❀a(z, unicorn(z), seek(Bill,ˆλR.[ˇ R](z)))
5.5 A Comparison with Categorial Approaches
The analysis presented here has strong similarities to analyses of the same phe-
nomena discussed by Morrill (1993) and Carpenter (1993). FollowingMoortgat (1992a),
they add to an appropriate version of the Lambek calculus ((Lambek , 1958))
the scope connective ⇑, subject to the following proof rules:
Γ, v : A,Γ′ ⇒ u : B ∆, t(λv.u) : B,∆′ ⇒ C
∆,Γ, t : A ⇑ B,Γ′,∆′ ⇒ C
[QL]
Γ⇒ u : A
Γ⇒ λv.v(u) : A ⇑ B
[QR]
In terms of the scope connective, a quantified noun phrase is given the category
N ⇑ S, which semantically corresponds to the type (e→ t)→ t and agrees with
the propositional structure of our linear formulas for quantified noun phrases,
for instance (8). A phrase of category N ⇑ S is an infix functor that binds a
variable of type e, the type of individual noun phrases N, within a scope of type
t, the type of sentences S. An intensional verb like ‘seek’ has, then, category
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(N \ (S)/(N ⇑ S), with corresponding type (((e→ t)→ t)→ e→ t). 6 Thus the
intensional verb will take as direct object a quantified noun phrase, as required.
A problem arises, however, with sentences such as
(15) Bill seeks a conversation with every unicorn.
This sentence has five possible interpretations:
(16) a. seek(Bill,ˆλP.every(u, unicorn(u), a(z, conv-with(z, u), [ˇ P ](z))))
b. seek(Bill,ˆλP.a(z, every(u, unicorn(u), conv-with(z, u)), [ˇ P ](z)))
c. every(u, unicorn(u), seek(Bill, λˆP.a(z, conv-with(z, u), [ˇ P ](z))))
d. every(u, unicorn(u), a(z, conv-with(z, u), seek(Bill, λˆP.[ˇ P ](z))))
e. a(z, every(u, unicorn(u), conv-with(z, u)), seek(Bill, λˆP.[ˇ P ](z)))
Both our approach and the categorial analysis using the scope connective have
no problem in deriving interpretations (16b), (16c), (16d) and (16e). In those
cases, the scope of ‘every unicorn’ is interpreted as an appropriate term of type
e→ t. However, the situation is different for interpretation (16a), in which both
the conversations and the unicorn are de dicto, but the conversations sought
may be different for different unicorns sought. As we will show below, this
interpretation can be easily derived within our framework. However, a similar
derivation does not appear possible in terms of the categorial scoping connective.
The difficulty for the categorial account is that the category N ⇑ S represents
a phrase that plays the role of a category N phrase where it appears, but takes
an S (dependent on the N) as its scope. In the derivation of (16a), however,
the scope of ‘every unicorn’ is ‘a conversation with’, which is not of category S.
Semantically, ‘a conversation with’ is represented by:
(17) λP.λu.a(z, conv-with(z, u), [ˇ P ](z)) : (e→ t)→ (e→ t)
The undirected Lambek calculus ((van Benthem , 1991)) allows us to compose
(17) with the interpretation of ‘every unicorn’:
(18) λQ.every(u, unicorn(u), Q(u)) : (e→ t)→ t
to yield:
(19) λP.every(u, unicorn(u), a(z, conv-with(z, u), [ˇ P ](z))) : (e→ t)→ t
As we will see below, our linear logic formulation also allows that derivation
step.
In contrast, as Moortgat (1992a) points out, the categorial rule [QR] is not
powerful enough to raise N ⇑ S to take as scope any functor whose result is a
S. In particular, the sequent
6These category and type assignments are an oversimplification since intensional verbs like
‘seek’ require a direct object of type s → ((e → t) → t), but for the present discussion the
simpler category and type are sufficient. Morrill (1993) provides a full treatment.
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(20) N ⇑ S⇒ N ⇑ (N ⇑ S)
is not derivable, whereas the corresponding “semantic” sequent (up to permu-
tation)
(21) q : (e→ t)→ t⇒
λR.λP.q(λx.R(P )(x)) : ((e→ t)→ (e→ t))→ ((e→ t)→ t)
is derivable in the undirected Lambek calculus. Sequent (21) will in particular
raise (18) to a function that, applied to (17), produces (19), as required.
Furthermore, the solution proposed by Morrill (1993) to make the scope
calculus complete is to restrict the intended interpretation of ⇑ so that (20)
is not valid. Thus, contra Carpenter (1993), Morrill’s logically more satisfying
account of ⇑ is not a step towards making reading (16a) available.
We now give the derivation of the interpretation (16a) in our framework.
The f-structure for (15) is:
(22)
f :


pred ‘seek’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:


spec ‘a’
pred ‘conversation’
oblWITH i:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘unicorn’
]




The two formulas Bill-seeks and every-unicorn can be derived as described
before:
Bill-seeks: ∀Y.(∀s, p.(∀X.hσ❀X −◦ s❀pX) −◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆY )
every-unicorn: ∀G,S.(∀x.iσ❀x −◦ G❀Sx)
−◦ G❀every(u, unicorn(u), Su)
As explained in more detail in Dalrymple, Lamping, Pereira, and Saraswat
(1993), the remaining lexical premises for (22) are:
a: ∀H,R, T.((∀x.(hσvar)❀x −◦ (hσrestr)❀Rx)
⊗(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ H❀Tx))
−◦ H❀a(z,Rz, T z)
conv-with: ∀Z,X. (hσvar)❀Z ⊗ i❀X
−◦ (hσrestr)❀conv-with(Z,X)
From these premises we immediately derive
∀X,H, T.iσ❀X ⊗ (∀x.hσ❀x −◦ H❀Tx))
−◦ H❀a(z, conv-with(z,X), T z)
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which can be rewritten as:
(23) ∀H,T.(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ H❀Tx) −◦
∀X. (iσ❀X −◦ H❀a(z, conv-with(z,X), T z))
With the substitutions
X 7→ x,G 7→ H,S 7→ λv.a(z, conv-with(z, v), T z))
formula (23) can be combined with every-unicorn to yield the required quantifier-
type formula:
(24) ∀H,T.(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ H❀Tx) −◦
H❀every(u, unicorn(u), a(z, conv-with(z, u), T z))
Using substitutions
H 7→ s
T 7→ p
Y 7→ λR.every(u, unicorn(u), a(z, conv-with(z, u), [ˇ R](z))))
and modus ponens, we then combine (24) with Bill-seeks to obtain the desired
final result:
fσ❀seek(Bill,ˆλR.every(u, unicorn(u), a(z, conv-with(z, u), [ˇ R](z))))
We see thus that our more flexible connection between syntax and semantics
permits the full range of type flexibility provided categorial semantics without
losing the rigorous connection to syntax. In contrast, current categorial accounts
of the syntax-semantics interface do not appear to offer the needed flexibility
when syntactic and semantic composition are more indirectly connected, as in
the present case.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that our deductive framework allows us to predict the correct set
of readings for intensional verbs with quantified and nonquantified direct objects
if we make a single assumption: that intensional verbs require a quantified
direct object. This assumption is, of course, the starting point of the standard
Montagovian treatment of intensional verbs. But that treatment depends on the
additional machinery of quantifying in to generate de re readings of quantified
direct objects, and that of explicit type raising to accommodate unquantified
direct objects. In our approach those problems are handled directly by the
deductive apparatus without further stipulation.
These results, as well as our previous work on quantifier scope, suggest
the advantages of a generalized form of compositionality in which the seman-
tic contributions of phrases are represented by logical formulas rather than by
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functional abstractions as in traditional compositionality. The fixed applica-
tion order and fixed type requirements of lambda terms are just too restrictive
when it comes to encoding the freer order of information presentation in nat-
ural language. In this observation, our treatment is closely related to systems
of syntactic and semantic type assignment based on the Lambek calculus and
its variants. However, we differ from those categorial approaches in provid-
ing an explicit link between functional structures and semantic derivations that
does not depend on linear order and constituency in syntax to keep track of
predicate-argument relations. Thus we avoid the need to force both syntax and
semantics into an uncomfortably tight categorial embrace.
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